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Abstract. The Ethiopian government initiated the Ethiopian Co®ee Trademarking and
Licensing Initiative in 2004 for three co®ee origins: Sidama, Yirgache®e and Harar. Fol-
lowing a court case between Starbucks and the Ethiopian government regarding this
initiative, Oxfam organized a publicity campaign. This paper evaluates the e®ect of these
interventions on the export prices of trademarked Ethiopian co®ees. We ¯nd that the
prices of the trademarked co®ees increased by about 10% following these interventions.
The magnitude of this change is comparable with the farm gate prices reported in the
literature; however, we cannot establish direct causation or observe the passthrough into
farm gate prices.
Introduction and Background
Co®ee is one of the most valuable agricultural commodities traded in international mar-
kets and Ethiopia is the birthplace and the primary center of diversity of Arabica co®ee
(Daviron & Ponte, 2005; Labouisse et al. , 2008). Ethiopia produces around 5% of world
production and more than 30% of the total production in Sub-Saharan Africa (ICO). Be-
sides the cultural importance, co®ee has an important place in Ethiopian economy because
it provides 35% of the total export earnings (CSA, 2008). Ninety ¯ve percent of the total
Date: March 23, 2010.
Key words and phrases. Trademarks, Co®ee Prices, Public Campaign, Oxfam, Starbucks, Ethiopia.
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co®ee output is produced by over one million small-scale producers and more than 10 mil-
lion Ethiopians belong to the co®ee value chain directly or indirectly (Bastin & Matteucci,
2007).
The Ethiopian government took a bold step based on intellectual property rights to
control the value chain and to protect the names of its high quality co®ees. In 2004 the
Ethiopian Intellectual Property O±ce (EIPO) collaborated with Light Years IP, a devel-
opment group based in Washington DC, to create a system that would capture more of
the retail value of Ethiopia's ¯ne co®ees within the country. The result was The Ethiopian
Co®ee Trademarking and Licensing Initiative led by the EIPO in conjunction and con-
sultation with the Ethiopian Fine Co®ee Stakeholder Committee that consists of growers,
small traders, exporters, cooperatives and local development bodies (Ethiopian Co®ee Net-
work, ECN (2009)). Within this framework, Ethiopia is registering trademarks in foreign
markets for three ¯ne co®ee types: Yirgache®e, Sidama, and Harar, and then licensing
importers and others involved in the distribution of these co®ees for the use of these terms.
Twenty-nine countries had signed the Trademark and Licensing Initiative as of August
2009 (Belete, 2009).
The goal of this Initiative is to de-commodify Ethiopian ¯ne co®ees and de-link their
price from the New York Exchange based price for Arabica co®ee. The signatories enter into
a brand management strategy with the government and public promotions. All companies
that want to promote these will need a license (ECN, 2009). Although the licenses are
royalty free, the Ethiopian government expects the brand management strategy to increase
global demand for specialty co®ees and create wealth in the long run (Kurata, 2008).
Trademarks are also expected to give the government more leverage in managing the whole
supply and distribution chain and increase the share that farmers receive from the retail
co®ee price.
The road to successful registration of trademarks in some countries, however, was not
smooth. In 2005, the Ethiopian government ¯led applications in the US to register all
three names as trademarks. At that time, Starbucks had already an ongoing application
to register the name of \Shirkina Sundried Sidamo" and ¯led a suit against the EthiopianCOFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 3
governments claims to register \Sidamo" as a trademark.
1 The case ignited worldwide
protests against the company under the leadership of Oxfam America.
2 Under the pressure
of bad publicity, Starbucks dropped its claim for the trademark and ¯nally signed the
agreement in 2007. This high-pro¯le case created support for Ethiopian co®ee and its
farmers, however it is not clear how the Initiative is a®ecting the prices of the trademarked
co®ees. An analysis of whether and to what extent the export prices have been a®ected
by this Initiative and publicity will improve our understanding of the roles of di®erent
schemes to protect intellectual property. It will also shed light into the question of whether
trademarks are a viable tool to help poor farmers bene¯t from the increasing trade in
specialty products from developing countries.
In Section 1, we present an overview of the global co®ee market with special focus on
Ethiopia. In Section 2, we describe the dispute that lead to the publicity campaigns to
support the Trademarking and Licensing Initiative, and the reasons why the Ethiopian
Government chose trademarks to protect these co®ees. We describe the data and present
some descriptive statistics in Section 3 and present the results of our empirical analysis in
Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 with policy recommendations.
1. World Coffee Market
Ninety percent of world co®ee is produced in developing countries, whereas most of it
is consumed by developed countries. World production of co®ee in 2008 was 7.6 million
metric tons, 60% of which was produced by the top four producing countries, i.e. Brazil,
Vietnam, Colombia and Ethiopia (ICO).
3 Similar to other primary commodities, co®ee
prices are highly volatile and show periods of high prices followed by oversupply and low
prices (Daviron & Ponte, 2005). The international Co®ee Agreement (ICA) played a role
1The name of the \Sidama" region is subject to political debate. We use the name \Sidamo"
when referring to the legal procedure that explicitly was about that term. In the rest of the arti-
cle we use \Sidama" in keeping with current practice: http://sidamatimes.blogspot.com/2007/10/
worldwide-campaign-to-stamp-out-sidamo.html
2To read more about the Oxfam campaign see: http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/campaigns/
coffee/news_publications/starbucks-campaign-anatomy-of-a-win
3International Co®ee Organization, Total Production of Exporting Countries: http://www.ico.org/
prices/po.htm.COFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 4
in stabilizing prices but since its expiration in 1989, prices have been more volatile. In
2002, real co®ee prices were at their lowest level in a century which was termed \the co®ee
crisis."
Producing countries liberalized their domestic co®ee sectors to varying degrees after the
expiration of ICA. Ethiopian co®ee market has also undergone liberalization e®orts, es-
pecially following the fall of the Derg regime in 1991. The reforms reduced the role of
government in co®ee marketing, increased the role of private exporters, and allowed for
direct exports of co®ee through farmers' cooperatives (Gemech & Struthers, 2007). Previ-
ous research shows that these reforms increased the price volatility and price transmission
from World market to domestic market in Ethiopia (Gemech & Struthers, 2007; Worako
et al. , 2008).
During the period of domestic reform in producing countries, the \co®ee paradox" was
in the making in the world co®ee market. Daviron & Ponte (2005) de¯ne the co®ee paradox
as the coexistence of a co®ee price crisis in producing countries with a co®ee price boom
in consuming countries. The main reason underlying the co®ee paradox is identi¯ed as the
change in the value chain structure from a producer driven to a consumer driven chain.
Most of the value is now added in consuming countries by roasters and retailers, hence
decreasing the share captured in producing countries.
Producing countries that have a potential to add intangible value to their co®ees have
attempted to take advantage of this shift in emphasis by consumers. The demand for
specialty co®ees, e.g. organic, fair trade, bird friendly and single origin, had been increasing
in spite of the stagnant overall demand. Ethiopian co®ee has always received a price
premium in international markets due to its ¯ne quality (Teuber, 2007). Ethiopian co®ees
receive consistently more than 90 points in international tastings.
4 Especially Sidama,
Yirgache®e and Harar co®ees have been sold in the retail market for up to US$26 per pound,
while farmers receive around US$1.50 for the same co®ee (ECN, 2009). The Ethiopian
government's Trademarking and Licensing Initiative is a step towards capturing more of
4Co®ee Review: http://www.coffeereview.com/allreviews.cfm?find=ethiopia.COFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 5
this value in Ethiopia and thereby increasing the incomes of the millions of smallholder
producers.
2. Trademarking Initiative and Starbucks Case
The Ethiopian government applied to the U.S. Patent and Trademark O±ce (USPTO)
to register the names of Sidama, Yirgache®e and Harar co®ees as trademarks in March
2005. Starbucks, however, had an already ongoing application to trademark \Shirkina
Sun-Dried Sidamo" and refused to drop its claim to clear the road for the Ethiopian gov-
ernment's Initiative (Faris, 2007). The Ethiopian government appealed to USPTO to block
the application from Starbucks, which dropped its claim in July 2006 but still did not sign
the Trademark license agreement. This dispute ignited a big public campaign by Oxfam
America, which was publicized in NPR, the BBC, CNN, Time, Fortune, and The Wall
Street Journal and created pressure on Starbucks (Perera, 2007). This global campaign
urged Starbucks to sign the licensing agreement. Oxfam International declared December
16, 2006 as the \Starbucks Day of Action" encouraging people to request from Starbucks
that it signs the agreement to honor its commitments to improve the lives of poor co®ee
farmers it buys co®ee from. Around 100,000 people had contacted Starbucks by the end of
the Oxfam campaign and Starbucks ¯nally signed the agreement in June 2007. Meanwhile,
the Specialty Co®ee Association of America (SCAA) protested the registration of Sidamo
as a trademark and suggested that Ethiopian co®ee should rather be protected with Geo-
graphical Indicators. The USPTO kept refusing the registration of Sidamo until February
2008, when the registration was complete after detailed evidence from the government of
Ethiopia showing that the geographic term had \acquired distinctiveness" making it eligi-
ble for a trademark protection (Rotstein & Christie, 2009). As of August 2009, the three
co®ee names were registered in 29 countries and more than 90 companies had signed the
agreement (Belete, 2009).
Trademarks vs Geographical Indicators. In order to capture more of the value of
the single origin co®ees in producing countries some form of intellectual property toolCOFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 6
must be used. Geographical designations can be protected by trademarks or geographical
indicators, both of which have di®erent bene¯ts and costs in di®erent settings (Schuessler,
2009). trademarks are traditionally owned by a particular enterprise, whereas geographical
indicators can be used by anyone who complies with the standards. Schuessler (2009)
de¯nes the main distinction between trademarks and geographical indicators as the fact
that trademarks identify the producer of a product or service, geographical indicators
identify the place of origin and characteristics that derive from that origin. For the case
of Ethiopian Trademarking and Licensing Initiative, however, this distinction is blurred
since the trademark identi¯es the place of origin and characteristics, and it is owned by
the government itself rather than a private enterprise.
Ethiopian government justi¯es the novel choice of trademarks as a tool to protect the
geographical designations of its co®ees with two main claims. First, the main goal of the
Trademarking Initiative is stated as \gaining more control over the market" and geograph-
ical indicators are assumed to give not as much control to their owner as trademarks do.
5
Second, the Ethiopian co®ee sector is characterized with more than one million smallholder
producers on over four million small plots which would make registering and enforcing ge-
ographical indicators very di±cult and costly (Rotstein & Christie, 2009).
Consequently trademarks were chosen over geographical indicators, which was the main
reason behind the con°ict between the Ethiopian government, Starbucks and the SCAA.
The government is currently planing to extend the trademarks to two more co®ee origins.
Before an extension is implemented, it is essential to understand how the existing Initiative
and the Starbucks publicity a®ected the prices of these co®ees. One of the main goals of
Ethiopian government was to improve the incomes of its small-scale co®ee farmers. There
is anecdotal evidence that the Initiative is making improvements in the lives of farmers in
villages, however there is no quantitative study that supports this claim. Ideally the e®ect
of the Initiative on farmers' livelihoods should be studied using farmer level panel data from
regions covered by the trademark and those that are not. However, given the fact that any
5Schuessler (2009) mentions that while this may be true in many markets, in the US both trademarks and
geographical indicators can provide similar levels of control all the way down to the retail level.COFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 7
program needs to a®ect the export prices before its e®ects can reach farmers, our study
is a ¯rst step in understanding the e®ects of the Initiative on the prices of trademarked
co®ees.
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We analyze the historical price development of all types of Ethiopian co®ee to iden-
tify whether and how Trademark Initiative and Starbucks publicity a®ected the prices of
Sidama, Yirgache®e and Harar co®ees vis-¶ a-vis co®ees of other origins using data from the
Ethiopian Customs Department collected by the ¯rst author during a ¯eld trip to Ethiopia
in March 2009.
6 The data include the price, origin, grade and certi¯cation status of all
co®ee shipments (around 24,000 data points) from November 2004 to February 2009. We
also use data from the International Co®ee Organization (ICO), which publishes data on
global production, trade and prices of arabica and robusta co®ees from all producing and
consuming countries.
7 These data, however, do not di®erentiate between grades or speci¯c
origins of co®ees within producing countries. Therefore, we use ICO data only to provide
a general overview of the global co®ee market.
Figure 1 shows the producer prices in Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia and Uganda (all arabica
producers) as a percentage of the daily average prices in New York and German markets
since 2004. Producers' prices in Brazil have been between 80 to 90% and Colombian
producer prices have been around 80% of the average ICO price. Ugandan producers'
prices have been around 50% of the ICO price with a slight upward trend. The Ethiopian
producers' prices show a higher volatility and have decreased from around 70% to under
60% with two brief hikes at the end of 2006 and 2007.
These ¯gures however do not tell us much about the share of the producers' prices in
the ¯nal retail price. Daviron & Ponte (2005) show that the farm gate price in Uganda
is around 7% of the retail price along the Uganda-Italy supermarket value chain (pp.208).
Light Years IP found that Ethiopian farmers were receiving around 6% of the ¯nal retail
6We thank to Mohammad Garad from the Light Years Intellectual Property (LYIP) for his support in
obtaining this data.
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Figure 1. Producer prices as % of ICO Brazilian Naturals prices in selected arabica
producing countries
price before the start of the Trademarking Initiative (LYIP, 2008). The main reason
behind the di®erence between the producer share of ICO prices and ¯nal retail prices is the
fact that most of the value to co®ee is added by roasters and retail outlets in consuming
countries. Especially for countries with high quality co®ees like Ethiopia, the di®erence
between the import and retail prices may be very high. Starbucks was selling Shirkina
Sun-Dried Sidamo for US$26 per pound, while the ICO prices were around one dollar per
pound for Brazilian Naturals.
8 This big discrepancy motivated the Ethiopian government
to establish the Initiative in order to capture more of the retail value within the country.
The government believes that most of this value is created in the regions where these co®ees
are grown { otherwise roasters would have been able to create the same value for other
co®ees of di®erent origin as well.
In order to understand the e®ects of the Initiative on co®ee prices, one needs to di®er-
entiate between di®erent origins, grades (Ethiopian export co®ee is graded from 1 to 5)
and certi¯cation status (e.g. organic, fair trade...etc.). The ICO data does not cover these
important determinants of co®ee prices. The Ethiopian Customs data include detailed
8Ethiopian co®ee is classi¯ed under the Brazilian Naturals group along with Brazil and Paraguay in ICO
statistics.COFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 9
information and allow us to control for all these characteristics that a®ect the price of
co®ee.
Almost all commercial co®ee production in Ethiopia takes place in two main regions:
Oromia and Southern Nations and Nationalities (SNNP). Sidama and Yirgache®e are in
SNNP, while Harar is in Oromia region.
9 The three trademarked co®ees make up around
43% of total exported co®ee registered by the Ethiopian Customs, and Sidama alone is
around 30% of the total (Table 1).
Table 1. Percentages of trademarked and non-trademarked cof-
fee volumes in total exports
Year Sidama Yirga. Harar Non-TM
2004 32.6 4.5 63.0
2005 32.2 5.4 4.7 57.7
2006 29.4 3.9 9.7 56.9
2007 33.0 4.9 8.8 51.8
2008 26.4 4.6 8.2 59.4
2009 19.5 3.1 11.4 65.5
Total 29.9 4.7 8.5 56.8
Source: ICO Data and authors' calculations from
Customs data.
Table 2 shows the prices of the three trademarked co®ees and the non-trademarked
co®ees exported from Ethiopia relative to the ICO prices of Brazilian Naturals. In spite of
stagnant price levels for Brazilian Naturals in international markets and non-trademarked
Ethiopian co®ee, the prices of trademarked co®ees increased consistently, especially after
2005. Relative to the ICO prices, the non-trademarked co®ee prices have been declining,
while the trademarked co®ee prices have been constantly increasing since 2004.
These observations, however, are based on unconditional means only and do not necessar-
ily represent the e®ect of the initiative on prices. During the same period, the international
demand for specialty co®ees such as organic, fair trade or bird friendly co®ees increased
9Sidama is the name of a region; Yirgache®e is the name of a village in Sidama with special agro-ecological
conditions; and Harar is the name of a city. These di®erent de¯nitions of the origins of trademarked co®ees
created confusion during the registry process of trademarks (Garad, 2009).COFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 10
Table 2. Ethiopian customs prices relative to ICO Brazilian Nat-
urals prices
Year Non-TM Sidama Yirgache®e Harar
2004 1.02 1.01 1.28
2005 1.01 1.05 1.29 1.24
2006 1.01 1.18 1.55 1.15
2007 0.98 1.19 1.64 1.26
2008 0.98 1.23 1.66 1.26
2009 0.98 1.45 1.90 1.38
Source: Authors' calculations using ICO and Ethiopian
Customs data.
(Bacon et al. , 2008). The increase in prices may be a result of a proliferation of certi¯-
cation programs or an increase in quality unrelated to the Initiative. In what follows we
analyze the price data from Ethiopian Customs to control for other variables to isolate the
impact of the Initiative and publicity on the prices of the three trademarked co®ees.
4. Empirical Analysis
The main goal of the econometric analysis is to identify whether the Trademarking
Initiative and the related publicity have coincided with an increase in the prices of the
trademarked co®ees as opposed to other Ethiopian co®ees. For illustrative purposes, we
¯rst estimate the monthly price premiums for all origins running the following regression
separately for each month:
log(Pi) = ®1Sidama + ®2Yirgache®e + ®3Harar + ¯O¡TM + °G + ui: (1)
Sidama, Yirgache®e and Harar are dummy variables identifying the trademarked cof-
fees, O¡TM is a vector of dummies for co®ee origins that are not trademarked (including
unknown origin), G is a vector of grade dummies identifying grades from undergrade to
grade 4 (grade 5 is the reference category) and i indicates each transaction in the data set.
We exclude organic and fair trade certi¯ed co®ees that constitute less than 1% of the total
co®ee exports in order to prevent convoluting the price e®ect of these standards with that
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03/05: Application to USPTO for TM
12/06: Starbucks Day of Action
06/07: Starbucks Signs the TM Agreemt.
10/07: USPTO approves Sidamo TM
Estimated Monthly Origin Premiums
Figure 2. Estimated origin premiums for each month and the landmarks of the pub-
licity of the Trademark Initiative
Figure 2 shows the premiums of trademarked (®1;2;3) and a selection of non-trademarked
co®ees estimated using the monthly cross-sectional regressions in equation 1.10 The dates
of important steps of the trademark process and the publicity are also marked (i.e. of
Ethiopian government's application to USPTO in March 2005, Oxfam's \Starbucks Day of
Action" in December 2006, Starbucks' signing of the Trademark and Licensing Initiative
in June 2007 and the USPTO's approval of the Sidamo trademark in October 2007). The
price premia in ¯gure 2 are not a®ected by any other developments in the national and
international co®ee markets that a®ected all Ethiopian co®ee equally. We can see that
the prices of the trademarked co®ees were moving closely with the prices of other co®ees
before the Starbucks Day of Action (12/06). After this date there seems to be an increasing
divergence between trademarked and non-trademarked co®ees.
Based on this observation, we identify the Starbucks Day of Action and Starbucks'
signing of the Initiative as potential structural break points in our further analysis of prices
over time. In order to identify whether these interventions caused a signi¯cant increase
10Dependent variable is the logarithm of price per kilogram in Ethiopian Birr (ETB).COFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 12
in the prices of trademarked co®ees as compared to other co®ees, we run the following
regression:




Oxfam and Star are dummy variables that equal one if the transaction occurred after
December 2006 and June 2007, respectively. TM is a vector of three dummy variables for
trademarked co®ees (i.e. Sidama, Yirgache®e and Harar), O is a vector of origin dummies
including the most common co®ee origins in the data and G is a vector of grade dummies.11
We control for the supply e®ect by including a variable that is equal to the percentage of
the total co®ee sold in a given month from each origin (V). In order to better identify the
main coe±cients of interest, i.e. ® and ¯, we also include monthly dummies (T) to control
for any aggregate co®ee price movements and month-origin interactions (TO) to control
for origin-speci¯c seasonality. Finally, we include the inverse of the physical weight (wit)
of each transaction to control for ¯xed costs and transaction costs of exporting each batch
of co®ee. Table 3 presents the results for the main coe±cients of interest in equation 2.
Table 3. OLS coe±cients of variables of interest
Variable Coe±cient Robust SE t-value
Oxfam*Sidama 0.067 0.006 13.31
Oxfam*Yirgache®e 0.116 0.011 11.53
Oxfam*Harar 0.045 0.011 5.31
Starbucks*Sidama 0.001 0.005 0.20
Starbucks*Yirgache®e 0.017 0.011 1.57
Starbucks*Harar 0.114 0.010 13.08
Source: Authors' calculations from Customs data.
Interestingly, the intervention dummies all have positive coe±cients, indicating that the
prices for the trademarked co®ees diverged from the non-trademarked co®ees after the
Oxfam and Starbucks interventions. For statistical tests of any reasonable size, it is easy
to reject the null hypothesis that there was no change for four of the coe±cients, and an
11We grouped origins that have very small number of observations in the data with the \Other" group.COFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 13
F test easily rejects the null hypothesis that all of these coe±cients show no divergence at
or near these dates; the p-value was vanishingly small. Furthermore F tests easily reject
the null hypotheses that all three Oxfam coe±cients or that all three Starbucks coe±cients
equal zero. Across both break dates, these origins rise in relative price by about 7% for
Sidama, 14% for Yirgache®e, and 16% for Harar.
The Oxfam and Starbucks break dates are close together with few observations between
them, so it is di±cult to precisely estimate which intervention is associated statistically
with which portion of the price increase. Regressions with just Oxfam dummies or just
Starbucks dummies yield similar results when compared with the sums of these interven-
tions estimated here. The exact break date does not matter for this exercise, though a
comparison of the weighted variance of the residuals reveals that the Oxfam-only speci¯ca-
tion has a lower variance (0.01182 versus 0.01186). Although the initial court case was over
the name of \Sidama" only, the Oxfam campaign did not single out one variety, rather they
pro¯led \poor Ethiopian co®ee farmers" against the \corporation." The Oxfam variables
seem to capture the main e®ect of this dispute and publicity on prices of all trademarked
co®ees. These ¯ndings are robust across di®erent speci¯cations with di®erent regression
weights (such as weighting each observation equally) as well. It is impossible to ¯rmly es-
tablish that the interventions caused this relative price change, but the rough magnitudes
of the relative price changes after 2007 are robust features of the data.
Table 4 compares the actual prices of trademarked co®ees with the estimated relative
price changes following the Oxfam and Starbucks campaigns. It is known that Ethiopian
co®ee origins have been di®erentiated for a long time and receive single origin premia in
international markets (Teuber, 2007). Estimating a price e®ect that is compatible with
these long established origin premiums with a trademark and international publicity can
be done with these data. Kodama (2007) reports that farmers in Yirgache®e received
1.4-2.6 ETB per kg. for their dry co®ee in 2006, and 0.1-0.2 ETB as dividends from their
cooperatives. The price e®ects that we identify are signi¯cant when compared with these
numbers. To compare the e®ects of these interventions to these numbers, we calculated the
average price of these varieties in the year 2006. Then we use the regression estimates toCOFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 14
see what the price of these varieties would have been in year 2006 had the post-intervention
price divergence already occurred by then.
Table 4. Actual and counterfactual prices with campaign e®ects (ETB/kg.)
2006 Price 2006 Price
(Actual) (Counterfact.) Di®erence
Sidama 22.32 23.90 1.58
Yirgache®e 29.21 33.39 4.18
Harar 21.64 25.37 3.73
The di®erences between the actual price and counterfactual price are of the same order
of magnitude as what the farmers themselves receive. How much of the premium generated
by the Trademarking and Licensing Initiative (and the ensuing publicity) °ows to farmers,
however, is a di®erent question that cannot be answered with our data. Answering this
question would require hard data on what has happened with farmers' share of export
prices.
Complicating the analysis, the Ethiopian government has been restructuring the cof-
fee trade drastically in the last couple of years. The introduction of co®ee trade in the
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) in December 2008 has created very di®erent views
from di®erent market participants. The ECX strives to increase transparency and improve
price discovery closer to the farmers via local trading centers (ECX, 2008). Price discovery
should improve farmers' share of the retail price as opposed to the current system where
farmers do not have the opportunity of ¯nding out the quality of their co®ee when they
sell it to traders. In spite of its °exible system intended to accommodate very detailed
grade and origin groups, the ECX has come under pressure from international specialty
co®ee traders who wanted to buy directly from farmers to ensure traceability (Mezlekia,
2009). The ECX recently introduced the Direct Specialty Trade where international buy-
ers directly buy from small co®ee cooperatives with a requirement that farmers receive a
minimum of 85% of the ¯nal export price (ECX, 2010). Prices on the ¯rst day of trading
ranged between US$2.15-4.02, which would constitute a signi¯cant increase for farmers ifCOFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 15
they really receive the stated share.12 These developments combined with the Trademark
Initiative are intended to increase farmers' share of the retail price, though detailed anal-
yses tracking farmer incomes over time are required to see whether they will be able to do
so.
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
We analyze the change in origin premia following Ethiopian Trademarking and Licens-
ing Initiative and the international publicity it created, using data on the export prices
of Ethiopian co®ee. We use detailed data from the Ethiopian Customs Department that
records every co®ee transaction in detail including origin, grade and certi¯cation status.
Oxfam organized an international campaign in response to Starbucks' refusal to sign the
Trademarking Initiative, which created signi¯cant global publicity and awareness of the
poverty among the millions of Ethiopian co®ee farmers. We ¯nd that the Oxfam cam-
paign was followed by an economically signi¯cant price increase in the trademarked co®ees
(Sidama, Yirgache®e and Harar) which is comparable to the farm gate price of co®ee in the
region reported in other studies, though it will take more work to see if this has materially
a®ected farmers' share of income from the co®ee value chain. If farmers receive the same
share of export income as they did before, then these relative price changes have translated
to income increases on the order of seven to sixteen percent.
Compared to other government Initiatives like the Direct Specialty Trade at the ECX,
the e®ects of the Trademarking and Licensing Initiative and the publicity seem fairly small.
In the absence of an international outcry like the Starbucks case created, it may be hard
to create a signi¯cant impact with the silent registration of trademarks in importing coun-
tries. The e®orts to increase demand for Ethiopian co®ee through trademarking need to be
coupled with other interventions to increase the prices signi¯cantly. These initiatives alone
will not be enough, however, to achieve the Ethiopian Government's laudable goal of im-
proving the welfare of its millions of small-scale co®ee farmers. An improved local market
12http://www.addisfortune.comCOFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 16
structure should be supported with improved extension services targeted to quality man-
agement and marketing to achieve this goal. Future studies need to focus on rigorous data
collection and direct analysis of farmers' welfare in order to identify the best approaches
of improving the welfare of the producers of these specialty co®ees in a fast changing local
and international co®ee market.COFFEE TRADEMARK IN ETHIOPIA 17
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